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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
STATE OF UTAH, 
In the Interest of 
A.Z., A Child under 




Case No. 20010591-CA 
Priority No. 4 
BRIEF OF APPELLEE STATE OF UTAH 
JURISDICTION 
T.Z. appeals from a final order of the Third District 
Juvenile Court terminating his parental rights to the above-
captioned child pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407 (Supp. 
2001). The Utah Court of Appeals has jurisdiction of this case 
pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-2a-3(2)(c) (Supp. 2001) and § 
78-3a-909 (1996). 
ISSUES PRESENTED AND STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
1. Whether there was sufficient evidence to support three of 
the juvenile court's factual findings. Standard of Review: the 
juvenile court's findings of fact will not be overturned absent 
clear error. Furthermore, an appellant wishing to challenge the 
sufficiency of the evidence to support a court's factual finding 
must first marshal all the evidence which supports that finding 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
and show that it is insufficient. State ex rel. C.B., 1999 UT 
App. 293, f5, 989 P.2d 76, 77-78. 
2. Whether the juvenile court's findings of fact support 
its ultimate conclusion that Appellant is unfit. Standard of 
Review: the juvenile court's conclusions of law are reviewed for 
correctness with no deference granted. However the juvenile 
court is entitled to a measure of discretion in its application 
of law to the facts. Id. 
STATUTES, RULES, CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS 
1. Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407. 
(Addendum A). 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
The Division of Child and Family Services (DCFS) filed a 
Verified Petition For Termination of Parental Rights in this 
matter on January 26, 2001. (R. 128-33). 
The Petition came for trial on June 5, 2001, before the 
Honorable Robert S. Yeates, Third District Juvenile Court. (R. 
190). The Court filed its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, 
and Order on July 2, 2001, terminating appellant's parental 
rights to A.Z. on numerous grounds. (R. 190-95; Addendum B). 
T.Z. filed a Notice of Appeal on July 18, 2001. (R. 199). 
2 
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STATEMENT OF FACTS 
T.Z. is the natural father of A.Z., a female child born 
November 26, 1991. He has been the custodial parent for most of 
her life. (R. 190; R. 210 at 104). l 
DCFS removed A.Z. from her father's home on or about 
September 3, 1997, based upon allegations of emotional 
maltreatment, physical abuse, and neglect. A.Z. was adjudicated 
as an emotionally abused child on December 1, 1997. She was in 
foster care from September 3, 1997 to July 1998. (R. 29-32, 34, 
46-50, 190-91). 
Between December 1997 and September 1998, DCFS provided a 
variety of reunification services designed to assist the father 
in regaining custody of his daughter. Those services included 
two episodes of family preservation, peer parenting, individual 
and family counseling, a psychological evaluation, and parenting 
classes. (R. 191; R. 210 at 84, 98-99, 104). 
A.Z. was returned to her father's custody on a trial home 
placement in July 1998. Permanent custody was restored to T.Z. 
on September 3, 1998, and jurisdiction of the juvenile court was 
terminated. (R. 57-59, 89-90, 99-101, 191).2 
1
 The natural mother, K.L.M., relinquished her parental 
rights on April 25, 2001. (R. 161-63). 
2
 Nowhere in his brief does Appellant acknowledge the fact 
that there were two separate court cases involving him, or that 
jurisdiction was terminated for a period exceeding a year between 
these two cases. 
3 
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DCFS removed A.Z. from her father's home a second time on 
September 7, 2000, based upon allegations of emotional 
maltreatment and physical abuse. A.Z. was adjudicated as an 
abused child on September 25, 2001, after T.Z. admitted to the 
allegations contained in the State's verified petition. DCFS has 
also investigated numerous Child Protective Services referrals 
concerning T.Z.'s care of his child. (R. 191, R. 210 at 84; Exh. 
#1) . 
In light of this family's history, the division was ordered 
to provide no reunification services to the father after the 
second removal. (R. 109-12, 118-22, 191). The State filed a 
Verified Petition for Termination of Parental Rights on January 
26, 2001. (R. 128-33). The petition came for trial on June 5, 
2001. (R. 190). 
The evidence presented at trial indicated that T.Z. has been 
diagnosed with a major depressive disorder which impairs his 
ability to parent. He demonstrates symptoms of anxiety and 
suffers from irrationality associated with depression. His 
depression tends to interfere with his ability to focus on the 
needs of his child. The father has also been diagnosed with 
Personality Disorder NOS with schizoid, avoidant and paranoid 
features which further impair his ability to properly care for 
A.Z. (R. 191; Exh. #4). 
T.Z. also leads a socially isolated lifestyle. He has few 
friends, if any, and has minimal family associations. He lives 
. 4; 
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his life as a loner, is unskilled in relationships, and is 
uncomfortable around others. The father presents in a hostile 
and intense manner and exhibits repetitive, concrete thinking and 
tends to fixate on fairness issues. He does not have the 
necessary insight or cognitive awareness to change his approach 
to parenting. (R. 191-92; R. 210 at 27; Exh. #1, 4). 
T.Z. has significant parenting deficits and limited 
parenting awareness skills. He has a difficult time placing the 
needs of his child above his own and has difficulty maintaining 
appropriate parent/child boundaries. The father also has a 
difficult time meeting the developmental needs of A.Z. and tends 
to rely on his daughter to meet his social and emotional needs. 
(R. 192; Exh. # 1 , 4). 
Finally, the father has a difficult time managing his anger 
and admitted to yelling or screaming at A.Z.,and to striking her 
on the head. Several months prior to trial, he began taking 
medications for his mental health problems. These medications 
appeared to stabilize T.Z. and it is unlikely that he could 
succeed as a parent on a long-term basis without them. (R. 192; 
R. 210 at 21, 24, 103, 107-09, 127, 129; Exh. #4). 
The father's mistreatment of his child has left her 
emotionally scarred. A.Z. shares an enmeshed and pathological 
relationship with her father. She has become parentified, and 
has been diagnosed with anxiety and attachment disorders. A.Z. 
5 
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has significant emotional and behavioral problems consistent with 
children who have been both abused and neglected. T.Z.'s actions 
and behaviors have damaged A.Z. to such an extent that she will 
have a hard time leading a normal life. (R. 192-93; R. 210 at 
32, 48, 51, 53-54; 59, Exh. #3). 
After hearing the evidence presented, the trial court issued 
its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order on July 2, 
2001. The court terminated T.Z.'s parental rights on grounds of 
abuse and neglect, unfitness, out-of-home placement, failure of * 
parental adjustment, failure of a trial home placement, and best 
interests, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-3a-407. (R. 190-95). 
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT 
Appellant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence to 
support the termination of his parental rights. However, he 
challenges only three of the court's factual findings, while 
ignoring other key findings. Furthermore, while he purports to 
marshal the evidence supporting these three findings, his 
argument is based upon misrepresentation. Accordingly, 
Appellant's entire argument is deceptive and disingenuous. The 
entire record in this case reveals a clear and adequate basis for 
terminating Appellant's parental rights. Therefore, the 
judgement should be affirmed. 
6 
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ARGUMENT 
I. APPELLANT'S SUFFICIENCY CHALLENGE FAILS BECAUSE HE 
CHALLENGES ONLY THREE FINDINGS AND THAT CHALLENGE IS 
BASED UPON A MISREPRESENTATION OF THE RECORD. 
Appellant argues that there was insufficient evidence to 
support the termination of his parental rights. More 
specifically, he argues that three of the juvenile court's 
findings were erroneous and that this error undermines the 
court's ultimate decision. However, Appellant's central claim of 
error is based upon misrepresentation and is, thus, not 
persuasive when viewed in light of the record as a whole. 
Appellant argues that the juvenile court erred in 
terminating his rights because he is currently a fit parent. He 
acknowledges his past deficiencies but claims to be currently fit 
because he is now taking medication to control his psychological 
problems. However, while conceding his past unfitness, he places 
all of the blame upon a former psychologist. In a nutshell his 
argument is this, he has a psychological disorder which is 
allegedly controllable through medication. Therefore, if the 
earlier evaluator had done his job properly, his disorder would 
have been remedied and he would not have been found to be unfit. 
Obviously, there are several problems with this argument, not the 
least of which is its inherent speculativeness. 
First of all, in order to make this argument persuasive, 
Appellant has to distort the record and omit a key fact. 
According to Appellant, there were two evaluations performed in 
7 
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this case, one by Dr. Icke, which was incorrect, and one by Dr. 
Reisinger-Marshall which was correct. However, what Appellant 
fails to acknowledge is that the evaluation performed by Dr. Icke 
was not, strictly speaking, part of this case. 
Appellant's daughter was first removed in September 1997. 
(R. 29). As part of those proceedings, Dr. Icke performed his 
evaluation of Appellant in November 1997. (R. 34). Eventually, 
in September of 1998, the father was found to be in compliance 
with his service plan, full custody was returned to him, and 
court jurisdiction was terminated. (R. 99-101) . 
However, in September of 2 000, A.Z. was removed again based 
upon allegations similar to her first removal. (R. 29-32, 109-
112, 191; R. 210 at 24, 85). This removal led to the current 
proceedings. Appellant completely fails to point out that there 
was an intervening period of two years where he had full custody 
and the state was not involved in his life. Reading Appellant's 
brief gives this Court the impression that these two separate 
cases were one seamless proceeding. 
In light of this important fact, the arguments that 
Appellant makes in his brief are tenuous at best. Given that Dr. 
Icke's evaluation was performed over three years prior to that of 
Dr. Reisinger-Marshall, it is difficult to say that it was 
necessarily incorrect at that time. This is particularly true 
given that those earlier proceedings ended with Appellant 
receiving custody of his daughter. His ostensible fitness 
8 
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suggests not that Dr. Icke's evaluation was incorrect, but rather 
that Appellant's psychological problems had not fully manifested 
themselves at that time. 
Moreover, assuming that Dr. Icke's dated evaluation was 
somehow relevant to these current proceedings, it was incumbent 
upon Appellant to introduce it into evidence and explain its 
relevance to the court. If this was Appellant's theory, he 
should have called Dr. Icke to testify, admitted his evaluation 
into evidence, and cross-examined Dr. Reisinger-Marshall about 
the earlier evaluation. In this manner he could have put this 
issue squarely before the court. 
Instead, appellant now takes the backhanded approach of 
speculating on appeal that the juvenile court disregarded Dr. 
Icke's evaluation because it was not credible. (Appellant's 
Brief at 10). If Dr. Icke had testified at trial and his 
evaluation had been entered into evidence, such speculation might 
possibly be warranted. However, given Appellant's failure to 
place such evidence squarely before the court, this argument is 
not very persuasive. The reason this prior evaluation is not 
mentioned is because it was not current, not introduced into 
evidence, and not relevant to the current proceedings. 
In any event, while Appellant's degree of psychological 
impairment at this earlier date is something which can only be 
speculated about, it is not really a crucial issue. What is 
9 
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clear is that Appellant has serious psychological problems, and 
that they have seriously impacted his parenting abilities. 
More importantly, his psychological problems have caused 
substantial damage to his child. This is really the most 
critical fact. Even assuming that Appellant is now fully cured 
by his current regimen of medication, which seems unlikely, it 
still does not make any difference. 
This Court has clearly held that any claim of current 
fitness by a parent must be considered in light of the effect of 
their past unfitness upon the parent/child relationship. State 
ex rel. M.L., 965 P.2d 551 (Utah App. 1998). In this case, such 
an analysis proves fatal to Appellant's claim of present fitness, 
assuming for the sake of argument that he is now fit. 
Several of the juvenile court's findings, which Appellant 
has failed to challenge, go directly towards this issue. For 
example, the court noted that Appellant leads a socially isolated 
lifestyle, has few friends, has generally poor interpersonal 
skills, and relies upon his daughter to meet his social and 
emotional needs. (R. 191-92, ff17-19). In short, rather than 
acting like a parent to his child and putting her needs first, 
his behavior has caused his daughter to become parentified and 
requires her to, in effect, parent him. Id.; see also (R. 210 at 
32, 61) . 
Furthermore, in light of her history of mistreatment, A.Z. 
is particularly in need of a stable nurturing home where she can 
10 
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heal, not a home where she must act like the parent. (R. 193, 
IUl-14)(courtfs best interest findings). Thus, while Appellant's 
mental health may have improved significantly with his new 
regimen of medication, he is a person who, emotionally, still has 
a long way to go. 
Moreover, his daughter bears the scars of his past abuse and 
needs far more than he can give her at this time. Thus it is 
clear that Appellant has been unfit, remains essentially unfit, 
and that his daughter's best interests require termination of his 
parental rights. Therefore, even assuming that Appellant's 
speculative claims of error were correct, his parental rights 
were still properly terminated. Accordingly, the juvenile 
court's judgment should be affirmed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant challenges the termination of his parental rights, 
arguing that he is presently fit. However, his arguments are 
speculative and based upon a distortion of the record. 
Additionally, he concedes his past unfitness but fails to 
acknowledge that his past abusive behavior has a continuing 
debilitating effect upon his child. The law makes clear that no 
claim to present fitness can outweigh the damage already done to 
the parent-child relationship by past abuse. Thus, even assuming 
Appellant's claim of present fitness was accurate, which is far 
11 
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from clear, it would not matter. Therefore, the juvenile courtfs 
judgment should be affirmed. 
STATEMENT CONCERNING ORAL ARGUMENT AND PUBLISHED OPINION 
The state requests neither oral argument nor a published 
opinion in this appeal. 
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78-3a-406 JUDICIAL CODE 554 
(e) the name and address of the person having legal 
custody or guardianship, or acting in loco parentis to the 
child, or the organization or agency having legal custody 
or providing care for the child; 
(f) the grounds on which termination of parental rights 
is sought, in accordance with Section 78-3a-407; and 
(g) the names and addresses of the persons or the 
authorized agency to whom legal custody or guardianship 
of the child might be transferred. 
(2) A copy of any relinquishment or consent, if any, previ-
ously executed by the parent or parents shall be attached to 
the petition. itS4 
78-3a~406. Not ice — Nature of proceedings . 
(1) After a petition for termination of parental rights has 
been filed, notice of that fact and of the time and place of the 
hearing shall be provided, in accordance with the Utah Rules 
of Civil Procedure, to the parents, the guardian, the person or 
agency having legal custody of the child, and to any person 
acting in loco parentis to the child. 
(2) A hearing shall be held specifically on the question of 
termination of parental rights no sooner than ten days after 
service of summons is complete. A verbatim record of the 
proceedings shall be taken and the parties shall be advised of 
their right to counsel. The summons shall contain a statement 
to the effect that the rights of the parent or parents are 
proposed to be permanently terminated in the proceedings. 
That statement may be contained in the summons originally 
issued in the proceeding or in a separate summons subse-
quently issued. 
(3) The proceedings are civil in nature and are governed by 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. The court shall in all cases 
require the petitioner to establish the facts by clear and 
convincing evidence, and shall give full and careful consider-
ation to all of the evidence presented with regard to the 
constitutional rights and claims of the parent and, if a parent 
is found, by reason of his conduct or condition, to be unfit or 
incompetent based upon any of the grounds for termination 
described in this part, the court shall then consider the 
welfare and best interest of the child of paramount importance 
in determining whether termination of parental rights shall 
be ordered. 
(4) Any hearing held pursuant to this part shall be held in 
closed court without admittance of any person who is not 
necessary to the action or proceeding, unless the court deter-
mines that holding the hearing in open court will not be 
detrimental to the child. 1994 
78-3a-407. Grounds for terminat ion of parental rights . 
The court may terminate all parental rights with respect to 
one or both parents if it finds any one of the following: 
(1) that the parent or parents have abandoned the 
child; 
(2) that the parent or parents have neglected or abused 
the child; 
(3) that the parent or parents are unfit or incompetent; 
(4) that the child is being cared for in an out-of-home 
placement under the supervision of the court or the 
division, that the division or other responsible agency has 
made a diligent effort to provide appropriate services and 
the parent has substantially neglected, wilfully refused, 
or has been unable or unwilling to remedy the circum-
stances that cause the child to be in an out-of-home 
placement, and there is a substantial likelihood that the 
parent will not be capable of exercising proper and effec-
tive parental care in the near future; 
(5) failure of parental adjustment, as defined in this 
chapter; 
(6) that only token efforts have been made by the 
parent or parents: 
(a) to support or communicate with the child; 
(b) to prevent neglect of the child; 
(c) to eliminate the risk of serious physical, men-
tal, or emotional abuse of the child; or .<>• >~ • 
(d) to avoid being an unfit parent; •**, -
(7) the parent or parents have voluntarily relinquished 
their parental rights to the child, and the court finds that 
termination is in the child's best interest; >U >-
(8) the parent or parents, after a period of trial during 
which the child was returned to live in his own home, 
substantially and continuously or repeatedly refused or 
failed to give the child proper parental care and protec-
tion; or 
(9) the terms and conditions of safe relinquishment of a 
newborn child have been complied with, pursuant to Title 
62A, Chapter 4a, Part 8, Safe Relinquishment of Newborn 
Child. sooi 
78-3a-408. Evidence of grounds for termination. 
(1) In determining whether a parent or parents have aban-
doned a child, it is prima facie evidence of abandonment that 
the parent or parents: 
(a) although having legal custody of the child, have 
surrendered physical custody of the child, and for a period 
of six months following the surrender have not manifested 
to the child or to the person having the physical custody of 
the child a firm intention to resume physical custody or to 
make arrangements for the care of the child; 
(b) have failed to communicate with the child by mail, 
telephone, or otherwise for six months; 
(c) failed to have shown the normal interest of a natu-
ral parent, without just cause; or 
(d) have abandoned an infant, as described in Section 
78-3a-313.5. 
(2) In determining whether a parent or parents are unfit or 
have neglected a child the court shall consider, but is not 
limited to, the following circumstances, conduct, or conditions: 
(a) emotional illness, mental illness, or mental defi-
ciency of the parent that renders him unable to care for 
the immediate and continuing physical or emotional 
needs of the child for extended periods of time; 
(b) conduct toward a child of a physically, emotionally, 
or sexually cruel or abusive nature; 
(c) habitual or excessive use of intoxicating liquors, 
controlled substances, or dangerous drugs that render the 
parent unable to care for the child; 
(d) repeated or continuous failure to provide the child 
with adequate food, clothing, shelter, education, or other 
care necessary for his physical, mental, and emotional 
health and development by a parent or parents who are 
capable of providing that care. However, a parent who, 
legitimately practicing his religious beliefs, does not pro-
vide specified medical treatment for a child is not for that 
reason alone a negligent or unfit parent; 
(e) with regard to a child who is in the custody of the 
division, if the parent is incarcerated as a result of 
conviction of a felony, and the sentence is of such length 
that the child will be deprived of a normal home for more 
than one year; or 
(f) a history of violent behavior. 
(3) If a child has been placed in the custody of the division 
and the parent or parents fail to comply substantially with the 
terms and conditions of a plan within six months after the 
date on which the child was placed or the plan was com-
menced, whichever occurs later, that failure to comply is 
evidence of failure of parental adjustment. 
(4) The following circumstances constitute prima facie evi-
dence of unfitness: 
(a) sexual abuse, injury, or death of a sibling of the 
child, or of any child, due to known or substantiated abuse 
or neglect by the parent or parents; 
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THIRD DISTRICT JUVENILE COURT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH x* 
•'> 
STATE OF UTAH, in the interest of 
ZUNKOWSKI, Alycia (11/26/91) 
A person under the age of eighteen years 
FINDINGS OF FACT, CONCLUSION 
OF LAW AND ORDER •"%"' 
CASE NO. 861080 
% 
The above matter came before the Court for trial on June 5, 2001, on the Amended 
Verified Petition filed by the State of Utah on May 3,2001 for Termination of the Parental 
Rights of Tom Zunkowski relative to the above-named child. Mr. Zunkowski was present and 
represented by counsel, Tupakk Renteria. The State was represented by Julie Lund, Assistant 
Attorney General, and the child was represented by Guardian ad Litem, Tracy Mills. 
The conduct of the trial is set forth in the minutes. The Court took judicial notice of the 
legal file. At the conclusion of the trial, the matter was taken under advisement with a decision to 
be rendered within thirty days. Having reviewed all of the evidence, the Court enters the 
following Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law and Order. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
PARENTAL FITNESS AND COMPETENCE 
The Court hereby finds by clear and convincing evidence that: 
1) Alycia Zunkowski is a nine year old female child having been born on November 26, 
1991. She is a resident of Salt Lake County; 
2) The natural father of the above-named child is Tom Zunkowski who resides at 287 
East Cordelio, #8, Salt Lake City, Utah; 
3) The natural mother of the above-named child is Karen Lorraine minor whose last 
known address was 1261 East 3745 South, Salt Lake City, Utah 84106; 
4) Alycia has had minimal contact with her mother since infancy and has been raised 
almost exclusively by her father. Ms. Minor voluntarily relinquished her parental rights to 
Alycia before this Court on April 25, 2001; 
5) Alycia was removed from the custody of her father on or about September 3,1997 by 
the Utah State Division of Child and Family Services (D.C.F.S.), based on allegations of 
emotional maltreatment, physical abuse and neglect; 
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6) On or about December 1, 1997, Alycia was adjudicated as an emotionally abused child 
by this Court; 
7) Alycia remained in foster case from September 3, 1997, to July of 1998; 
8) From December of 1997, until September of 1998, D.C.F.S. provided a variety of 
reunification services to assist Mr. Zunkowski in being reunited with his daughter. Two episodes 
of Family Preservation Services were provided as well as peer parenting services. Individual and 
family counseling were provided by the State as well as parenting classes and a psychological 
evaluation; 
9) On June 2, 1998, the Court authorized a trial home placement of Alycia with her father 
when deemed appropriate by DCFS; 
10) On September 3, 1998, permanent custody and guardianship of Alycia was restored 
to Mr. Zunkowski and Juvenile Court jurisdiction was terminated; 
11) On or about September 7, 2000, Alycia was again removed from the custody of her 
father by DCFS based on allegations of emotional maltreatment and physical abuse; 
12 ) On September 25, 2000, the Court adjudicated Alycia as an abused child relative to 
Mr. Zunkowski; 
13) Alycia has remained in the custody of DCFS since her second removal from her 
father on September 7, 2000; 
14) The Division has investigated numerous child protective services referrals concerning 
Mr. Zunkowski's care of Alycia; 
15) Mr. Zunkowski is diagnosed with a major depressive disorder which impairs his 
ability to parent. He demonstrates symptoms of anxiety and suffers irrationality associated with 
depression. His depression tends to interfere with his ability to focus on the needs of his 
daughter; 
16) Mr. Zunkowski is also diagnosed with a personality disorder NOS with schizoid, 
avoident, and paranoid features which further impairs his ability to properly care for his 
daughter; 
17) Mr. Zunkowski leads a socially isolated lifestyle. He has few friends if any, and has 
minimal family associations. Mr. Zunkowski lives his life as a loner and is unskilled in 
relationships and is uncomfortable around others; 
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18) Mr. Zunkowski tends to present in a hostile and intense manner. His speech is stilted 
and deliberate. He exhibits repetitive concrete thinking and tends to fixate on fairness issues. 
Mr. Zunkowski does not appear to have the necessary insight on cognitive awareness to change 
his approach to parenting; 
19) Mr. Zunkowski has significant parenting deficits and limited parenting awareness 
skills. He struggles to place the needs of Alycia above his own and has difficulty maintaining 
appropriate parent, child boundaries. Mr. Zunkowski has a difficult time meeting the 
developmental demands of Alycia and tends to rely on his daughter to meet his social and 
emotional needs; 
20) Mr. Zunkowski has a difficult time managing his anger and admits to yelling and 
screaming at Alycia and striking her on her face and head; 
21) Since January of 2001, Mr. Zunkowski has been taking medications for his 
personality disorder and for mood management. The medications appear to have had a 
stabilizing effect on him. Without medication given his history and emotional functioning 
coupled with his lack of parenting skills and personality characteristics, it is unlikely that he 
would succeed as a parent on a long-term basis; 
22) Mr. Zunkowski's depression and attending anger pose a risk of harm to Alycia; 
23) Alycia has been removed from her fathers care on two different occasions by the 
State of Utah during the last four years. Both removals involved emotional maltreatment and 
physical abuse. Between the first and second removal, the State of Utah provided Mr. 
Zunkowski with numerous services to help him improve his parenting skills. Even with their 
services, Mr. Zunkowski has been unable to make the fundamental changes necessary to safely 
parent his daughter. He has damaged his daughter emotionally to the point that she will more 
than likely have a difficulty in leading a normal life; 
24) Mr. Zunkowski poses an ongoing risk of harm to Alycia due to his mental health and 
depression problems coupled with his anger management issues; 
BEST INTEREST OF THE CHILD 
1) Alycia is a bright and precocious child whose intellectual functioning is in the "high 
average" range; 
2) Mr. Zunkowski loves his daughter and wants to be reunited with her. Alycia loves her 
father and is concerned about him; 
3) Alycia presents as a child who has been neglected. She is aggressive and 
demonstrates socially inappropriate behaviors. Alycia is a very demanding and challenging child 
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and always wants to be the center of attention. Her social functioning is delayed but has 
improved significantly while in foster care. 
4) Alycia demonstrates emotional and behavioral problems consistent with children who 
have been abused. She is angry and internalizes her anger and aggression towards 
herself. Alycia is hyper sexualized and seems to use a seductive interpersonal style to 
achieve attention for herself and appears older then she is. She views herself as a fragile 
person and sees the world as a threatening place; 
5) Alycia desperately wants to connect with others but fears rejection. She is diagnosed 
with a reactive attachment disorder yet has bonded well to the two foster families she has resided 
with since her second removal; 
6) Alycia has also been diagnosed with an anxiety disorder and is a difficult child to &.<. 
manage as a result of her attachment problems and her anxiety disorder. She also suffers from 
depression; 
7) Alycia shares an emeshed and pathological relationship with her father. She is very 
parentified and acts as a caretaker for her father and has bonding issues with him; 
8) Alycia loves her father but is angry toward him for his hurting her in the past; 
9) Alycia is a child who is easy to love but difficult to deal with because of her behavioral 
problems and her manipulative behaviors. She is a needy child who can be aggressive in pursuit 
of affection and acceptance and she tends to be clingy; 
10) Alycia has specialized needs and requires stability and structure; 
11) Alycia wishes to be adopted by an older half-sister, Angela Mandeville, who resides 
in New York. Ms. Mandeville has expressed an interest in adopting Alycia and came to Salt 
Lake City to visit with her for a week earlier this year; 
12) Alycia is doing very well in her current foster placement but is anxious to be placed 
with her half sister. Alycia is concerned about her father but nevertheless wishes to be placed 
with her half-sister in New York; 
13) Alycia has made significant progress since being placed back into foster care in 
September of 2000. She has become more social and less anxious and less preoccupied with 
taking care of her father; 
14 There is no question that Mr. Zunkowski loves Alycia. It is also clear that Mr. 
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Zunkowski has a history of being physically and emotionally abusive toward his daughter which 
has been very detrimental to her growth and development. It is equally clear that the best 
interests of Alycia would be served by the termination of her father's parental rights to free her 
for adoption; 
Therefore, based on the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court makes the following: 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1) That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3a-407(2), Alycia Zunkowski has been 
abused and neglected by her biological father, Tom Zunkowski, justifying the termination of his 
parental rights; 
2) That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Section 78-3a-407(3), Tom Zunkowski is an unfit 
and/or incompetent parent due to emotional and/or mental illness which has rendered him unable 
to care for the immediate and continuing physical needs of Alycia for extended periods of time, 
thereby justifying a termination of his parental rights; 
3) That pursuant to Utah Code Ann Section 78-3a-407(4), Alycia Zukowski has been 
cared for in in out-of-home placement under the supervision of the Division of Child and Family 
Services. The Division has made diligent efforts to provide appropriate services and Mr. 
Zunkowski has substantially neglected, willfully refused or has been unable or unwilling to 
remedy the circumstances that caused Alycia to be in an out-of-home placement, and there is a 
substantial likelihood that Mr. Zunkowski will not be capable of exercising proper and effective 
parental care in the near future, thereby justifying a termination of his parental rights; 
4) That pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 78-3a-407 (5), Tom Zunkowski has failed to make a 
parental adjustment, thereby justifying a termination of his parental rights; 
5) That pursuant to Utah Code Ann.78-3a-407(8) Mr. Zunkowski, after a period of trial 
during which Alycia was returned to live in her home, substantially and continuously or 
repeatedly refused or failed to give his daughter proper parental care and protection; 
6) That it is in Alycia Zunkowski's best interest to be adopted where she will have the 
opportunity to be protected from abuse and neglect; 
7) It is proper that an order be entered permanently terminating the parental rights of Tom 
Zunkowski to Alycia Zunkowski; 
ORDER 
1) The parental rights of Tom Zunkowski are hereby permanently terminated relative to 
Alycia Zunkowski including any residual rights. 
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2) Temporary custody and guardianship of Alycia is continued with the Division of Child 
and Family Services for the purpose of adoption. 
3) A hearing for review of the permanency plan for the child shall be set in the manner 
provided by law. 
Dated this 2a%clay of July, 2001 
CERTIFICATE OF MAILING 
I hereby certify that I delivered a true and exact copy to the following: 
yulie Lund 
Assistant Attorney General 
160 East 300 South 
Sixth Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
yPfacy Mills 
Guardian ad Litem 
450 South State Street 
Second Floor 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84114 
#PUpakk Renteria 
Laherty and Associates 
Counsel for Tom Zunkowski 
Boston Building, Suite 400 
9 Exchange Place 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Dated this day of July, 2001 
Deputy Court Clerk 
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
